Os. First, while hiding with your family during wartime your baby starts to cry; would you suffocate your crying baby in order to save the rest of your family from being discovered and killed by soldiers? Second, you are out with your family when you come across a child who has clearly been assaulted and is lying by the side of the road crying; do you assist them and call for help? Both of these decisions involve processing of `right’ and `wrong’ in terms of socially constructed moral rules. Both also have emotionally laden consequences and require processing of others’ points of view (theory of mind). However, the first decision feels much more difficult than the second, involves a greater degree of mental conflict, will elicit more deliberation and will be met with less unanimity as to the `correct’ choice (Greene et al., 2004). Together, these two scenarios clearly represent the ends of a moral continuum and offer a powerful illustration of the extent to which moral decisions can engage us in very discrepant ways. The key question is exactly how patterns of neural activation in the moral network might differ when processing these varied classes of moral challenge. One possibility is that network activation will only differ as a function of the different cognitive parameters recruited (i.e. conflict resolution, engagement of systems involved in deliberative reasoning). If this were the case, difficult moral decisions may only differ from easy moral decisions in their recruitment of the dlPFC and ACC (Greene et al., 2004). However, another possibility is that varying decision BX795 web difficulty will have interactive effects on the recruitment of other components of the moral network. In other words, both classes of moral choice might require significant and broadly comparable appreciation of how the people involved will be affected by any choice that is made (i.e. theory of mind). If this were the case, mPFC and TPJregions known to be associated with perspective takingmay be recruited for both difficult and easy decisions. Such a finding would suggest that a shared cognitive process underlies a broad spectrum of moral challenges. However, it is also plausible that easy moral decisions solely rely on automatic and reflexive processingwhich is often associated with limbic activation (Moll et al., 2005). A further possibility is that the interplay and interactive effect of these various cognitive processes may engage some regions while disengaging others. For example, an easier moral decision may elicit less activation (or even deactivation) in the dlPFC simply because any dlPFC engagement would be redundant, or even a source of interference, when BLU-554 site choices are reflexive and automatic. We sought to investigate these various possibilities using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while participants negotiated difficult vs easy moral decisions. Critically, we also included matched difficult and easy non-moral decision conditions. This allowed us to evaluate not only differences within the moral domain as a function of decision difficulty but also to investigate whether manipulation of `difficulty’ changes the pattern of activation in other regions of the moral networkrelative to activation patterns for comparable non-moral choices. In other words, does moral cognition make flexible use of different regions of the moral network as a function of the demands of the moral challenge?Deconstructing the moral networkSCAN (2014)Fig. 1 (a) Experiment.Os. First, while hiding with your family during wartime your baby starts to cry; would you suffocate your crying baby in order to save the rest of your family from being discovered and killed by soldiers? Second, you are out with your family when you come across a child who has clearly been assaulted and is lying by the side of the road crying; do you assist them and call for help? Both of these decisions involve processing of `right’ and `wrong’ in terms of socially constructed moral rules. Both also have emotionally laden consequences and require processing of others’ points of view (theory of mind). However, the first decision feels much more difficult than the second, involves a greater degree of mental conflict, will elicit more deliberation and will be met with less unanimity as to the `correct’ choice (Greene et al., 2004). Together, these two scenarios clearly represent the ends of a moral continuum and offer a powerful illustration of the extent to which moral decisions can engage us in very discrepant ways. The key question is exactly how patterns of neural activation in the moral network might differ when processing these varied classes of moral challenge. One possibility is that network activation will only differ as a function of the different cognitive parameters recruited (i.e. conflict resolution, engagement of systems involved in deliberative reasoning). If this were the case, difficult moral decisions may only differ from easy moral decisions in their recruitment of the dlPFC and ACC (Greene et al., 2004). However, another possibility is that varying decision difficulty will have interactive effects on the recruitment of other components of the moral network. In other words, both classes of moral choice might require significant and broadly comparable appreciation of how the people involved will be affected by any choice that is made (i.e. theory of mind). If this were the case, mPFC and TPJregions known to be associated with perspective takingmay be recruited for both difficult and easy decisions. Such a finding would suggest that a shared cognitive process underlies a broad spectrum of moral challenges. However, it is also plausible that easy moral decisions solely rely on automatic and reflexive processingwhich is often associated with limbic activation (Moll et al., 2005). A further possibility is that the interplay and interactive effect of these various cognitive processes may engage some regions while disengaging others. For example, an easier moral decision may elicit less activation (or even deactivation) in the dlPFC simply because any dlPFC engagement would be redundant, or even a source of interference, when choices are reflexive and automatic. We sought to investigate these various possibilities using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while participants negotiated difficult vs easy moral decisions. Critically, we also included matched difficult and easy non-moral decision conditions. This allowed us to evaluate not only differences within the moral domain as a function of decision difficulty but also to investigate whether manipulation of `difficulty’ changes the pattern of activation in other regions of the moral networkrelative to activation patterns for comparable non-moral choices. In other words, does moral cognition make flexible use of different regions of the moral network as a function of the demands of the moral challenge?Deconstructing the moral networkSCAN (2014)Fig. 1 (a) Experiment.